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PREFACE: 
This essay is basically an analysis of the 
last chapter of Professor D.J. O'Connor's book 
An Introduction to the Philos° h of Sducation. 
It is generally critical of that book's positivist 
stance and examines three matters in particular: 
the Verification Principle, the possibility of 
Metaphysics, and the nature of 8thical Judgements 
as O'Connor deals with then. 
The Introduction draws attention to the fact 
that the book accepts the viewpoint of contemporary 
philosophical analysis. 	It points. out that the 
author is inti-speculative and anti-metaphysical, 
and that nonetheless he embraces an extreme 
empiricist position with r , tionalict writing. 	It 
draws attention to the influence the book seems to 
have had upon student teachers despite its sweepino 
generalizations. 	It recognises the value of 
linguistic analysis but questions whether a thorough 
philosophical study of the matters raised in the book 
would lead to the cnnclusions drawn by Professor 
O'Connor. 
Chapter I The Verification Principle  
emphasizes the difficulties which A.J. Ayer's thesis 
met and which the author seems not wholly to recognise. 
Not only is the formulation of the principle open to 
question but its verification is impossible if we are 
to accept it in logicvl positivist terms. Modern 
views of language mice it very difficult to apply simple 
dichotomies. 	A criticism follows of O'Connor's 
use of the word "experience" and his implied definition 
of "knowledge". 
i 4 . 
It is argued that his conception of "knowledge" and 
his conception of "theory" are both ill-founded. 
Three theories are then referred to as 
respectable theories which would be rejected out of 
hand by O'Connor's methods: first, Chomsky's theory of 
language acquisition, secondly, Hick's eschatological 
approach to the verification of faith, and thirdly 
Boyce Gibson's contention that verification is a 
"gradually widening conviction". 	Finally there is a 
discussion of the phenomenon of comprehension. 
In the 2nd Chapter "Is Meta ninful......2_?” 
there is a critical analysis of the way in which 
O'Connor deals with Castle and Maritain, and of the 
way he misinterprets the three "basic" questions. * It 
is suggested that there is need to distinguish between 
the contemplation of one single object and the 
contemplation of the world taken as a whole. The 
concept of falsification is discussed in relation to 
faith. 	It is further pointed out that we cannot 
explain the origin of an ordered cosmos as a whole in 
terms of a prior orderliness for that would be part of 
the cosmos we are trying to explain. 	It is argued 
that O'Connor's case against metaphysics is itself 
metaphysical. 
In the 3rd Chapter "Ethical Judgements" it is 
recognised that educational judgements have an ethical 
content. 	The positivist argues that value judgements 
are relative and emotive. 	This chapter examines the 
possibility of moral judgements being true or false, 
and the existence of criteria for such judgements. 
The Conclusion makes a brief analysis of the 
current climate in education and argues that there is 
* What are we? Where are we? Where ought we to be going? 
a place for a Christian Philosophy of Education. 
I am grateful to the Archbishop of Melbourne 
who provoked me into beginning this small study of the 
relationship between faith and knowledge, to Professor 
Selby Smith who encouraged me, and above all to John 
Radvansky who reintroduced me to the joys of being a 
student, and without whose inspiration I would not have 
embarked on a journey of which this essay is a modest 
beginning. 
INTRODUCT/ON 
In the preface to his book "An Introduction 
to the Philosophy of Education" Professor D.J.0 1Connor 
wrote 
"The view point represented here is that of 
contemporary philosophical analysis. This label does 
not, as is often supposed, apply to a single school of 
philosophy but is used to refer to the work of a large 
number of philosophers of very widely differing views. 
However, they do share certain attitudes and ways of 
thinking which have not yet been sufficiently represenied 
in writings on education. 	Indeed, the only previous 
attempt of this kind so far as I am aware, is Professor 
C.D. Hardie's excellent little book 'Truth and Fallacy 
in Educational Theory- published in 1942 and now out 
of print." (Page V) 1 
The publication of O'Connor's book followed 
some controversial correspondence in "The Times" 
referred to in the Educational Supplement's review. 2 
The professor had criticised sharply the teaching given 
under the title of "Philosophy of Education" which he 
described as " a collection of edifying °biter dicta, 
composed by men, from Plato to Whitehead, whose real 
interests lay elsewhere." 	This particular reviewer 
recognises the pioneer effort in the book. 	For the 
first time there became available to students an 
introduction to modern philosophic trends and some 
indication of how linguistic analysis could help,in the 
consideration of educational theory and practice, 
especially in the areas of criticism and clarification. 
For this reason it was, as Archambault called it, "an 
original and influential book". 3 
The reviewer in the Literary Supplement is aware 
of this originality and potential influence4 
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"No branch of knowledge is more in need of the 
antiseptic, not to say sterilizing ministrations of the 
logical analysts than that of education. Indifferent 
practitioners in a multitude of departments and colleges 
pour out every year for the thousands of teachers in 
training a stream of theories on the aims and purposes 
of education. 	It is good to have them faced with the 
question "What do your sentences mean, if they mean 
anything at all?" 	 At a price students can 
afford, concise instatement, clear in argument, the 
book is dangerous - to those who would wish the schools 
to maintain their characteristically Christian 
atmosphere which is in such marked contrast to the world 
outside." 
This reviewer, rightly in my opinion, states that 
O'Connor's main discussion concerns the teaching of 
religion and morality, and that the unsettling effects of 
his approach "can easily spread from the universities to 
the schools." 	Indeed the final chapter discusses 
"some of the philosophical issues basic to any educational 
theory" 5 ; and it discusses them in a way that is 
unsettling, as we shall see. 
The reasons for examining this final chapter in 
detail are firstly that it contains, as the author and 
most reviewers suggest, the meat of the argument. 
Secondly, if the book is influential it is important to 
consider how its readers may be influenced. Finally, 
if it is a pioneering, original effort it is necessary 
to bring the new ideas under criticism. 
A cursory glance at the reviews which followed 
close upon publication confirms that nearly everyone 
seeking to convey the flavour of the book refers to the 
final chapter. Professor Benne6 , after quoting 
extensively from pages 111 to 113, writes: 
"These quotations suggest the anti speculative, anti-
metaphysical bias of Professor O'Connor's viewpoint." 
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L. Arnaud Reid quotes at length from pages 113, 114, 
115, 132 and 137 in his review7 as he summarises the 
argument of the book. 	If as well the author himself 
claims in the final chapter to discuss the basic issues, 
and many of his reviewers agree that he has done so, it 
seems fair to limit one's analysis to this chapter. 
That the book is widely read can be seen from the 
fact that it has been continually reprinted and is required 
reading in many teachers' colleges and education 
faculties. That it is influential does not necessarily 
follow, but at the least it could be quoted as 
authoritative support for the views expressed in it, for 
example the view that religion is irrelevant to 
education. (p 137) 	It would be impossible to show 
that a number of teachers and students hold the opinions 
they do because Professor O'Connor wrote this book. It 
would be difficult to show that it was a seminal work in 
the development of Logical Positivist attitudes among 
teachers. All / shall attempt to demonstrate is in 
what regard the final chapter is Positivist. I shall 
do no more than suggest that the general educational 
climate in Australia is Positivistic, and note the 
coincidence. 
Thirdly and most importantly I shall take what 
"The Times" called the sharp edged tools of linguistic 
philosophy into this final chapter in order to determine 
if possible the meaning of significant statements made 
and to consider the validity of the arguments. This is 
simply to do with O'Connor's "Philosophy of Education" 
what he has done with his predecessors in the field. He 
sees Philosophy as a second order discipline and would 
probably agree with the metaphor of a two storey building 
in which ordinary people carry on their everyday business 
and conversation on the ground floor, while philosophers 
observe this business and conversation from a bird's eye 
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view on the first floor. 8 	The philosopher of 
education examines educational statements for their 
meaning, for the methods of verification, for their 
status in logic, and for their relationship to 
knowledge, and in turn his own statements will come 
under scrutiny from his fellow workers on the sane 
floor. 	It is the philosopher's business to make 
second order statements whenever these help to 
clarify first order statements and therefore first 
order knowledge. 	It is his business to "try to 
provide the analysis of concepts like 'cause', 'self', 
'voluntary action', 'obligation', 'good', 
'society' and so on". 	He hopes by his activity to 
"reveal logical tangles." 	(p 112) 
O'Connor counts himself among "those philosophers 
who are called 'critical empiricists' or 'logical 
analysts' " (p 112). 	There is here an admission 
that there are other 'schools' of philosophy. 	Some 
critics have felt that O'Connor's attitude toward 
these other philosophers is not very tolerant. Such 
philosophers seem to be parcelled together under the 
term 'irrationalist', and O'Connor says earlier in 
his book (p 26) 
"The irrationalist will decry what he calls 
'intellect' or 'logic' and praise instead mysterious 
impulses and intuitions. 	It is a very widespread 
attitude and characterizes the intellectually lazy, 
the woolly minded, the fanatical and the superstitious. 
And it is the more pernicious in having supporters who 
enjoy some reputation - philosophers such as Nietzsche 
and Bergson, theologians like Kierkegaard and a great 
many artists and writers, to say nothing of well known 
pretentio0s mystagogues like Rudolf Steiner and 
Ouspensky", 
s . 
As A.M. Kean points out 9 this is rationalist 
writing with a vengeance; he continues, . 
"Any kind of analysis tends, we feel, to 
commit a fundamental error if, in applying a criterion 
of truth it divides intellectual behaviour into the 
sheeplike And the goatlike, and leaves matters there. 
In the last resort the goats have to be explained and 
justified like the sheep; indeed they have to be 
justified better than they could do it themselves." 
There would be a very long list of philosophers, 
theologians, artists, writers and mystagogues (if we 
might so name Otto and Happold) who would dissent from 
O'Connor's views. 	He seems to have selected names in 
order to build a case on the doubts which already exist 
in the mind of the reader about the people he has chosen. 
It is not surprising that he deals with Jacques Maritain 
later in this chapter in a way which Arnaud Reid l° calls 
scandalously unfair". 
It is surely a cardinal principle of philosophy 
to take seriously the carefully expressed views of other 
honest philosophers and of accepted authorities in what 
we have termed first order disciplines. For a critical 
empiricist it would seem particularly important to avoid 
emotional arguing. Yet as Kean points out ll 
"Although Professor O'Connor repeatedly warns the 
reader and himself against sweeping generalizations he 
does not succeed in avoiding some quite wild generalizations 
and is sometimes unfair to his opponents." 
There is also a more subtle kind of generalization 
of which one should be aware. O'Connor writes that the 
work of sritical empiricists 
"does not give us any new knowledge 	 rather it 
gives j a new point of view on what we already know"(p 112) 
"it does not pretend to add to our knowledge of the world" (p 113) 
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"it can have the positive result of clarifying and 
refocusing our thinking" (p 113) 
"The word 'philosophy' promises much more than this to 
many people. How can we be sure that this promise 
cannot be honoured? " (p 113) 
Mlle have the sane reason for rejecting metaphysics as we 
have for rejecting witchcraft" (p 114) 
"We have positive grounds ......for rejecting the 
grandiose claims of metaphysics" (p 114) 
The underlining is mine and draws attention to the plural 
pronoun which M.B. Poster examines in his article 
If We in Modern Philosophy" 12 
The constant repetition of 'we', 'us' and four' can no 
doubt be defended by saying that an impersonal form is 
hard to naintain in a long essay without dullness, and 
the first person singular sounds egotistical. Nonetheless 
it is awesome for the student to be told that ",Eg: have 
positive grounds" for the clear inference is that 
sensible people would accept the view of "mm0 experts. 
As a student reads this chapter he is invited by inference 
to identify himself with "us". 	Now this is polemical, 
persuasive, emotional writing and should be scrupulously 
avoided by anyone claiming the objectivity which O'Connor 
claims. 	I must therefore advance with caution not only 
to avoid being enmeshed in his embracing plural pronoun 
but also to avoid setting traps of my own. 
No philosopher would quarrel with O'Connor's 
starting point when he says that in one of his roles at 
least, a philosopher is "a sort of inspector or assayer 
who rejects those theories and arguments which can be 
shown to be faulty by the logical touchstones or gauges 
which are his stock in trade" (p 112). 	Much benefit 
has come in the twentieth century as philosophers have 
aimed to clear up puzzlement, prevent misleading 
construction of language and expose absurd theories rather 
than to get a clearer view of the structure of reality. 13 
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CHAPTER I 
THE VERIFICATION PRINCIPLE 
O'Connor's touchstone can be summarised In two 
quotations from his chapter on "The Nature of Philosophy" 
"the results of any tort of enquiry are acceptable 
in so far as they are publicly testable, reliable and 
coherent with the rest of public knowledge" (p 17) 
"public recognition by experts, progressive 
corrigibility, and coherence with established knowledge 
are 	the best guarantees we have" (p 45) 
The word 'testable' bears witness to the trouble Ayes 
Verification Principle ran into in the late thirties and 
forties but the argument of the chapter under review is 
squarely based on the Verification Principle in its 
complete rejection of Metaphysics. 	According to 
O'Connor any scientific use of language must be the 
utterance of a tantology or of an empirical statement. 
But what is to be said of the Verification 
Principle itself? 
Early in its history extreme claims were made that 
meaningful sentences must be reducible to possibilities of 
experience which could conclusively verify the proposition 
under discussion. But verificational analysis moved 
away from this 'strong sense of 'verify' to what Ayer 
terns the 'weak' sense of the word.' 
It was seen that conclusive verification would 
be out of the question for such vitally important state-
ments as scientific expressions of general law, since no 
finite set of observations could in principle succeed in 
verifying conclusively a universal statement for the 
simple reason that the observations are limited to the 
past and the universal statement includes the future. 
Under the 'weak' interpretation of verification synthetic 
9, 
statements can be more or less fully verified or 
probable but never conclusively verified or necessary; 
only analytic statements can be necessary. 
As soon as the concept of verification comes 
under analysis one realises the difficulty of formulating 
the principle. Hick for example2 	iicingIy argues 
that the central core of the concept is the removal of 
ignorance or uncertainty concerning the truth of some 
proposition. The proposition is 'verified' when something 
happens Which makes it clear that the proposition is true. 
A question is settled when rational doubt is removed. 
The way in which doubt is removed will vary according to 
the subject matter. Such a view throws open the question 
whether the notion of verification is purely logical or 
is both logical and psychological, and the form in which 
O'Connor enunciates the principle does nothing to settle 
the issue. But I am not concerned at this point with 
the way in which the principle of verification is 
formulated. A more awkward question arises when one 
asks, what is the status of the Verification Principle 
as here formulated? 
"the results of any sort of enquiry are 
acceptable in so fax as they are publicly testable, 
reliable, and coherent with the rest of public knowledge" (p 17) 
According, to O'Connor this statement must either be a 
tantology, that is a rule of language, or it must be an 
empirical proposition. The statement looks like a 
synthetic,proposition telling the reader something about 
the world, contingent upon the way the world is. 	If 
this is so then one mUst ask, how is the proposition to 
be verified?, and the answer is that it cannot be verified 
in the terms required by the proposition. 
Perhaps,then, the Verification Principle is a 
generalization resulting from an exhaustive study of 
10. 
metaphysical statements all of which had been found to 
be meaningless independent of the principle. Such a 
view would not be acceptable to the Logical Positivist 
because it would involve the , examination of each new 
metaphysical statement to see if perchance one might be 
meaningful and so prove an exception to the rule. As 
Popper3 has pointed out the essence of a scientific 
theory is that it should be falsifiable; one should be 
able to envisage what conditions would invalidate the 
theory even though one does not expect such conditions 
to Obtain. (vd. Note) 
If metaphysical statements must of necessity be 
meaningless then the Verification Principle is analytic 
and a priori; it is a rule of language of a conventional 
character. 	But then the opponents of Positivism would 
be entitled to say, that is a convention we can manage 
without and we therefore continue to call metaphysics 
meaningful. 
If the word "meaningless" is made by the Positivists 
to include all metaphysical statements in a stipulative 
fashion there remains a difficulty of another kind. 
Opponents have to lump together as nonsense 
"Melodic cheese billows explicitly" 
"God answered my prayer" 
"This is good" 
and some would find it hard to be convinced that this is 
a reasonable attitude. 
In "Metaphysics and Verification" 4 Wisdom wrote: 
"Well, shall we accept the verification principle? 
What is to accept it? When people bring out with a 
dashing air the words 'The meaning of a statement is 
really simply the method of its verification', like one 
who says 'The value of a thing is really simply its power 
of exchange', in what sort of way are they using words? 
What is the general nature of their theory? The answer 
is, *It is a metaphysical theory*." 
Stevenson to whom O'Connor refers with 
qualified approval in the chapter on value judgements 
writes this: 5 
"It is of no little service to stress the ways in 
which metaphysics has been confused with science; and to 
the extent that positivists have done this their *conquest 
of metaphysics' has not depended on exhortation. But do 
their distinctions take us more than half way to a full 
rejection of metaphysics? Are we led to go the other 
half by the word tnonensel defined so that it may cast 
its objectionable emotive meaning upon metaphysics, 
without being predicated of it untruthfully. The same 
question arises even when metaphysics is denied cognitive 
meaning only. 'Cognitive' is used to mean 'empirically 
verifiable or else analytic* and with exclusive laudatory 
import. 	Hence the positivistic contention reduces to 
this: 'Metaphysical statements are neither empirically 
verifiable nor analytic; hence they are not respectable.' 
If metaphysicians answer 'Our statements, even though 
neither empirically verifiable nor analytic, are still 
respectable', they are scarcely to be led away from their 
position by mere exhortation." 
These two quotations lead to the position where 
one questions whether O'Connor's logical touchstones are 
versatile enough to do the job he assigns to them. 
Wittgenstein6 argued - and it is an argument to 
which I shall return - that philosophers from Socrates to 
Moore had been mistaken in thinking that a formula could 
be found which would encompass the different uses of 
'knowledge' and 'justice' in which they were interested. 
Some words do not fall under a definition as *triangle' 
does in the field of geometry. Rather they form a family 
"united by a complicated network of similarities over- 
lapping and cries crossing; sometimes overall similarities, 
12. 
sometimes similarities of detail." 
He and others draw attention to the fact that we 
use language in ways which_make the application of simple 
dichotomies like analytic - synthetic, true-false, . 
impossible. The question to be asked is not simply, 
'Does this statement fit my category system and how does 
it measure up by my touchstone? but instead, 'What are 
people doing when they use ethical, scientific, metaphysical 
language, claim knowledge, express belief, make promises, 
or sympathize?' 
xt will be clear then that the point of view of 
this paper, while it is appreciative of the critical. 
empiricist position enundiated by Professor O'Connor, 
is broader in the sense of the statements from 
Wittgenstein and Wisdom. 
A philosopher, says O'Connor, in criticising any 
theories will formulate theories of his own but "such 
theories tend to be interpretations of experience 
in terms of experience and not like the theories of the 
metaphysical philosophers in terms of entities transcending 
experience. 	Philosophical theory construction ....is in 
the nature of a reshuffling of the items of experience 
into a comprehensible pattern like the solution of a jig 
saw puzzle." (p 112) 
The stress on 'in terms of experience' gives an 
empiricist flavour to the statement, but it is nevertheless 
not easy to understand what the phrase means. If , it 
means "in words that people recognize and understand" that 
would not exclude the metaphysician for nobody can describe 
the highest flights of imagination except in terms of his 
own experience; that is why angels tend to have harps, 
haloes, wings and nightshirts. The phrase is more likely 
to mean "set out in a series of synthetic propositions 
each of which can be verified" in which case one wonders 
13. 
why the particular phrase was used. 	Another 
possibility is that the writer is laying down a rule 
for the game he is going to play. Under the rule, 
statements like "To be true a proposition must correspond 
to an actual state of affairs" or 
"A sentence will be factually significant to a 
given person if and only if he knows how to verify the 
proposition which it purports to express; that is, if he 
knows what Observations would lead him Under certain 
conditions to accept the proposition as being true or 
reject it as being false " 7 a*e:admisSible:whOkoas 
statements like 
"Jesus said, I am the Truth" or 
"The Word of God is Truth" are inadmissible. 
Such a distinction may be valid but the status of the 
rule which makes that distinction is still in question 
as we have already seen. 
In a long chapter of his Introduction to 
Philosophical Analysis, John Hospers discusses the 
relationship between testability and meaning and ends 
with this comment8 
"The only area in which the testability criterion 
is at all plausible is in reference to empirical state.. 
ments, such as are made in daily life and in science. 
If you make some assertion about the world, you should be 
able to indicate what observations of the world would 
count for or against it." 
Earlier Hospers points out that true knowledge involves 
a belief that a proposition is true, the fact that it is 
true, and the existence of adequate evidence. O'Connor 
discusses this natter of adequate evidence on pages 17f. 
of his book and on page 31 he makes this comment: 
"For a question to be a genuine one, it must have a 
framework that will determine in advance the form that the 
answer must take and the terms in which it will be made. 
14. 
We have such a framework for a question when we know 
the sort of evidence that will give us the answer but 
are ignorant of exactly what the evidence will be." 
He therefore distinguishes sharply between the 
'knowledge' claimed by mathematicians, historians and 
scientists and that claimed by metaphysicians. 	He 
concludes that the only 'knowledge' worthy of the 
name is empirical knowledge. 
O'Connor restates his position in this way (p 112) 
"the work of 	critical empiricists, 	 does not 
give us any new knowledge as does the work of the 
scientist. 	Rather it gives us a new point of view on 
what we already know and so may properly be said to 
provide understanding rather than knowledge. 	By 
reformulating and reinterpreting the common content of 
human experience it tries to provide the same sort of 
unifying overall views of experience as traditional 
metaphysical systems purported to supply. But since 
it tries to do this without going beyond experience it 
does not pretend to add to our knowledge of the world." 
What is important in this passage is the implicit 
definition of 'knowledge'. Despite Bertrand Russell's 
warning: 
"Logical positivists have, in my opinion, misconceived 
the relation of knowledge to experience" 9 
O'Connor defines knowledge as that which the 
scientist provides or which at the least can be cognised 
by the senses. 	The only knowledge, he says, is 
empirical knowledge, and the implication is that one can 
be certain about that knowledge whereas there may be 
uncertainty about the interpretation or understanding. 
This is why (p 29) mathematicians and scientists enjoy 
"spectacular success" while moralists, metaphysicians, 
and theologians meet with a "notable lack of success". 
13, 
Such a cut and dried definition of knowledge may be 
alluring but many would not agree with it and O'Connor 
ought to acknowledge that fact. 
Now Bertrand Russell was an empiricist philosopher 
and in many ways sympathetic to the viewpoint expressed 
by O'Connor. For example he wrote that faith was 
"a firm belief in something for which there is no 
eAdence. We do not speak of faith that 2 plus 2 equals 
4 or that the earth is round. We only speak of faith 
when we wish to substitute emotion for reason." 10  
In a number of books Russell demonstrates his general 
agreement with the stance of the_antiA- metai3hysidians. 
In the final chapter of his "History of Western 
Philosophy" he applauds the methods of modern analytical 
empiricism and states: 
"I have no doubt that, in so far as philosophical 
knowledge is possible, it is by such methods that it 
must be sought; I have also no doubt that by these 
methods many ancient problems are completely soluble." 11 
It is significant therefore that in his great work on 
"Human Knowledge" he should deal cautiously with the 
verification principle and after a lengthy discussion 
make this comment: 
"You cannot without incurring an endless regress, 
seek the significance of a proposition in its consequences, 
which must be other propositions. 	We cannot explain 
what is the significance of a belief or what makes it 
true or false without bringing in the concept 'fact', add 
when this is brought in the part played by verification 
is seen to be subsidiary and derivative". 12 
In the same book Russell has chapter headings "Knowledge 
Transcending Experience" and "The Limits of Empiricism" 
and in one place he writes: 
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"Knowledge is a term incapable of precision. 
All knowledge is in some degree doubtful and we cannot 
say what degree of doubtfulness makes it cease to be 
knowledge, any more than we can say how much loss of 
hair makes a man bald." 
For O'Connor "knowledge" means "empirical knowledge" of 
a very specific type which can be verified by scientific 
procedures. This is a stipulative definition and it 
must follow therefrom that his "reformulating and 
reinterpreting" does not add to "knowledge". But such 
a statement is of doubtful value as a preliminary to 
discussing religion and morality since it is analytic. 
It says virtually "Knowledge is what can be discovered 
by scientific procedures, therefore only scientific 
procedures can add to knowledge". 	Yet the statement 
is presented as synthetic, telling the reader something 
about the world which is so fundamental that it explains 
why metaphysical statements (other than the verification 
hypothesis) are unacceptable. But as Frederick Fora 
points out: 14 
"There remain many problems confronting language which 
hopes to speak meaningfully about supernatural facts 
but we shall net advance our understanding of theological 
language by making it analytically impossible - as does 
verificational analysis - for language to refer to any 
but scientific facts. Such victories are too cheap to 
be convincing." 
Professor Pam; is one among many who have argued against 
the position taken up by O'Connor and it will not do to 
say, the Logical Positivist has positive grounds for 
rejecting metaphysics but a rough outline of the case will 
do for "it would need a book on the theory of knowledge 
to justify this point of view in detail" (p 114). For he 
is going on to examine what he calls "two crucial questions" 
(p 137) as if the point of view had been justified. The 
liveliness of the debate on this point of view in the 
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sixties and early. seventies suggests that (Monitors& 
basic assumptions, vital as they are to this chapter, 
are far from proven. 
O'Connor's approach to "knowledge" is as dogmatic 
as 	his approach to "theory" and "explanation". He 
defines "knowledge" as "empirical knowledge". In making 
such a definition he succeeds in doing what Socrates in 
the "Theaetetus" 15 failed to do but he works on the same 
assumption about general terns that Socrates worked on. 
First, by defining "knowledge" in the clear, cut way he 
has done, O'Connor assumes that there is no justification 
for applying a general term to its instances unless the 
instances have something in common other than that they 
are instances. Secondly, he assumes that nobody knows 
the meaning of a general term unless he is able to say 
what it means, that is to state what it is that the 
instances have in common and in virtue of which they are 
its instances. 	But these assumptions have been 
challenged, by Wittgenstein in the "Philosophical_ 
Investigations" and in the "Blue and Brown Books", and 
more recently by Renford Damborough in "Reason, Truth 
and God". 16 
The concept of knowledge is treated by Wittgenstein 
as a "family resemblances" concept. 	In the "Theaetetus" 
Socrates considers examples of knowledge. Every proposed 
definition that has any plausibility is based upon an 
examination of the most typical cases of knowledge. Each 
refutation consists in uncovering examples of knowledge 
that are not covered by the definition or in citing 
examples that are covered by the definition but are not 
cases of knowledge. What Socrates saw as failure - a 
failure that the Logical Positivists have overcome by 
stipulative definition - Wittgenstein sees as success, 
Por it is the great variety of the cases of knowledge, 
the lack of a single common element, and the complex 
structure of the concept which defeat attempts to 
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categorise the concept simply, to sum it up in a 
sentence, even one as famous as the Ayer sentence 
already quoted. What is important and illuminating 
is the fact that Socrates and his friends can already 
distinguish cases to which the term 'knowledge' applies 
from the cases to which it does not apply. 
Like Socrates we can know what 'knowledge is 
without knowing what the definition of knowledge is. 
Even if there existed a correct and useful definition 
of knowledge it would not be a means, and certainly not 
a necessary means, to knowing what knowledge is, since 
one would need to have a complete grasp of all the cases 
of knowledge, and of their relations to one another and 
to everything that is not knowledge before one could be 
sure the definition was correct. 
O'Connor's positivism naturally follows from the 
assumption that there is a formula or definition in 
which the common essence of all cases and types of 
knowledge can be summed up. He notices the differences 
between mathematics and the natural sciences, his chosen 
paradigms of knowledge, on the one hand, and morality, 
theology and metaphysics on the other. Then he rejects 
the instances which do not conform to his preconceived 
picture of the essence of knowledge. However, his 
reference to "natural knowledge" on page 113 indicates 
a half-hearted recognition that there is knowledge of 
another kind. 
Dr. C.B. Daly says pertinently: 
"If my empirical knowledge forces me to ask questions 
which cannot be answered in empirical terms, then I 
know that empirical knowledge is not adequate to the 
reality which I an. But to know that knowledge is 
inadequate is a valid and a most important kind of 
knowledge. It is a perpetual invitation to deeper 
reflection." 
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I have to this point amined O'Connor's 
conceptions of "theory" and "knowledge" for in these 
lie the "positive grounds" (p 114) upon which the 
discussion of religion and morality is based. If 
these concepts themselves are ill founded, as I have 
sought to show, then the remainder of the argument is 
suspect. Before proceeding with this analysis however 
there are two statements which are regrettable in a book 
that continually stresses the need for objectivity, which 
are rhetorical not reasonable, and which are polemical 
rather than philosophical. 
For example he gives as his "best reason" for the 
rejection of metaphysics (p 113) 
"Some of the ablest men have done their best during 
twenty-five centuries to work out metaphysical views of 
the universe and man's place in it which would provide 
a positive answer to these disputed questions of religion 
and morality and have all failed." 
Apart from the obvious fact that the words "positive" 
and "failed" need much closer examination, the statement 
is an exaggeration which does scant justice to the poets, 
prophets, saints, martyrs and reformers who are part of 
human history. Nor of course do we know what will 
happen in the twenty sixth century or the twenty seventh, 
am reminded of Donald Soper who was challenged at an 
open air meeting by a heckler who shouted "ChriStianity'd 
been in the world for nearly two thousand,years, and look 
at the state of the world!" 	He replied, "Soap's been 
in the world a bit longer and look at the state of your 
neck! " 
The second example of playing to the gallery is 
on page 1.14. 
"We have the same reason for rejecting metaphysics 
as we have for rejecting witchcraft, astrology or 
phrenology." 
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Dr. Ewing, whom he names in his bibliography, is 
among many who have offered sober defences for some 
metaphysical statements. 18 
Among others should be included Dr. Alvin 
Plantinga who writes: 19 
"The fact is that no one has succeeded in stating a 
version of the verifiability criterion that is even 
remotely plausible; and by now the project is beginning 
to look unhopeful 	 If the notion of verifiability 
cannot so uuch as be explained, if we cannot so much as 
say what it is for a statement to be empirically verified 
then we scarcely need worry about whether religious 
statements are or are not verifiable. How could we 
possibly tell?” 
Were there space and tine I would like to quote 
extensively from Professor H.D. Lewis2° who in his 
"Philosophy of Religion" surveys in detail the arguments 
concerning the validity of metaphysical statements. 
However, the simple point I want to stress is that 
reasonable defences of soma metaphysical statements have 
been made. 
By his insistence on J"public testability" and by 
his claim that experience can only be interpreted "in 
terms of experience", O'Connor appears deliberately to 
be outlawing the use of concepts which transcend 
experience. One of these concepts is "mind", and indeed 
some empiricist philosophers have tried to dispense with 
that particular concept. And yet despite the work of 
Ayer or Ryle or Skinner21 the concept of mind 
stubbornly survives. 
Many people find it efficacious to use 'mind' in 
their interpretation of experience, and it is especially 
difficult to theorise on the acquisition of language 
without using the concept. Using what I understand to 
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be -0 1Connor's touchstone it would be as faulty to 
include "mind" in a philosophical theory as it would 
to include "God". For that reason I deem it necessary 
to look more closely at a theory of language acquisition 
in order to see whether O'Connor's 'rule of the game' is 
a help or a hindrance. 
The modern linguist faces the phenomenon of a 
child's rapid move from vocal behaviour to.verbal 
behaviour, through sounds, babbling, words, to sentence 
formation. 
Mt the age of about one, a normal child not 
impaired by hearing loss or speech impediment will begin 
to say words. By one and a half or two years old, he 
will begin to form simple two and three word sentences. 
By four years he will have mastered very nearly the 	- 
entire complex and abstract structure of the (English) 
language." 22 
A common explanation of this phenomenon is that babies 
imitate what they hear because they are encouraged to do 
so, or because they enjoy doing so. Modern linguistic 
theory does not agree. Chomsky says: 23 
"It is not easy to find any basis (or for that 
matter to attach very much content) to the claim that 
reinforcing contingencies set up by the verbal community 
are the single factor responsible for maintaining the 
strength of verbal behaviour. The sources of the strength 
of this behaviour are almost a total mystery." 
Chomshy posited a theory of the growing child 
creatively constructing his language on his own in 
accordance with innate and intrinsic capacities, 
developing new structures of language, modifying and 
discarding old structures as he goes. The child acquires 
"grammars" within a very short period so that he can 
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effectively communicate with siblings, parents peers 
and adults generally; furthermore the "grammars" are 
derived from a limited sampling of the child's language. 
Not only is the process very rapid, it is resistant to 
distortion. 
Taking into account the limitations of memory, it 
seems unreasonable that a child can acquire and use, in 
a short time, a highly complex grammatical system by 
memorizing that set of utterances he has been exposed to 
and trying to reproduce the set. 	It seems feasible to 
postulate that what a child does is to acquire and use 
a set of rules which formulate the underlying regularities. 
These are the generative rules of the grammar of his 
language, and he uses these rules not only to generate 
the strings he may have heard but also to generate other 
possible strings. The concensus of psycholinguists is 
that the evidence gathered so far indicates that children 
develop, discard and refine rule systems, ultimately 
arriving at adult competence. It is postulated that 
there are innate determinants of the process of language 
acquisition which account for the universality of under-
lying structures. The nature of these structures and 
the complexity of the task so readily achieved by 
children leads researchers to theorise that a child's 
"mind" is set in a predetermined way to process the sorts 
of structures which characterize human language arriving 
at something like a transformation grammar of his native 
tongue. 24 
Dan Slobin writes: 
"One of the motivations for postulating innate 
mechanisms in language acquisition is the notion that 
the speech input is not a rich enough source for the 
induction of grammar. That is, as pointed out 
repeatedly above, the surface structures of sentences do 
not provide sufficient information for the 
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interpretation of those sentences." 25 
Theoretically it might be possible to formula e 
rules which would enable a machine to make the sort of 
linguistic judgements which are made by human beings. 
Hut in undertaking such a task we would need to set up 
a model of competence; we would need to consider an 
idealized performance of the language task. In practice 
many psychological variables intervene to distort 
behavioural predictions based on the pure competence 
model. 	Limits of memory prevent people from uttering 
or understanding sentences beyond a given length or level 
of complexity. Fatigue, inattention, distractability, 
emotional excitement affect linguistic performance in 
many ways not envisaged by the model of competence. 
Furthermore it seems clear that children are in possession 
of rules of language before they can put them into use; 
their "competence" outreaches their "performance". They 
have within them the capacity to generate and to under-
stand sentences they have -never heard. Furthermore as 
Chomsky has pointed out 26 people not only possess rules 
of language, they have the capacity to modify, and also 
the capacity to break them. 
In other words language capacity in man is very 
complex indeed. We know a great deal about the 
neurology of speech but as Zangwill has shown 27 all our 
knowledge of the mechanisms of speech and their relation 
to the brain do not enable us to understand how these 
mechanisms work. In spite of the vast accumulation of 
knowledge scholars are still unable to propose a 
biological theory of  language 28 . 	In the light of the 
facts known Chamsky has postulated "innate principles of 
the mind" for which he argues in his lecture on 
"Interpreting the World". 29 His theory has been 
challenged by several writers including David Crystal in 
"Linguistics" °, but my point is that Chomsky's writing 
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is serious scholarly and reasoned. 	By O'Connoes 
touchstone it would be inadmissible without debate; it 
would be ruled out of court as a metaphysical theory. 
Few modern linguists would wish to discard Chomsky's 
views out of hand. 
There are two other theories I wish to refer to 
in order to demonstrate how restricting the Logical 
Positivist position is. It does not matter whether 
one is attracted or repelled by the theories. The 
point is that they have been put forward by honest 
philosophers who value highly the philosophical 
developments of the twentieth century. 
First, John Hick 31 has put forward a verification 
theory in regard to the Christian Faith: 
"Although the system of Christian beliefs is not 
as a whole directly verifiable is there perhaps some one 
aspect of it which is in principle experientially 
confirmable and which can establish the factual charact*r 
of the other beliefs that are bound up with it? There 
are certain eschatological expectations - expectations 
About the ultimate future - which, I want to suggest, 
satisfy an acceptable criterion of factual meaningfulness 
and which impart to the Christian belief-system as a 
whole the character of a true or false assertion. 
But has not the notion of an after-life been ruled 
out by modern philosophers? The answer is that it is 
ruled out by some and not by others; and these latter 
include some of the most strongly science-oriented 
thinkers. For example Mbritz Schlick, who was at the 
centre of the Vienna Circle from which logical positivism 
originally emanated, held that the hypothesis that after 
death I shall continue to have conscious experiences is 
an empirical hypothesis. Schliek did not at all think 
that there ja an after-life, but he acknowledged that 
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the statement that there is is a genuinely factual 
assertion." 
If I have interpreted "in terms of experience" 
correctly, O'Connor would reject "eschatological 
expectations" as transcendental entities, and yet it 
does seem reasonable to suppose that if one lives after 
death one will know about it. 
Secondly, A. Boyce Gibson 1F writing in "Theism 
and Empiricism" has a rather different theory of 
verification which can be indicated through two 
quotations. 
"Verification can only take the form of a 
gradually widening conviction spread over the years 
from the hopes of youth to the meditations of age, and 
over situations swinging between crisis and routine 
that the way of faith is the sufficient way and one 
which promotes in each of its phases its own perpetuation. 
The verification of faith is not like the verifications 
of science." 
"We know (In answer to Ayer) perfectly well what 
would verify the Christian faith: its success in 
disposing of what we have called the counter evidence. 
We also know what would falsify it - its inability, in 
practice, to handle the counter evidence...., the 
verification of faith is not simply the verification of 
propositions: there has also to be verified a whole 
manner of feeling and acting. But as we have shown, 
the propositions are fused with it and diluted in it, 
and without them the verification is incomplete. 
Precisely for this reason, it has to come by way of a 
whole life and cannot be pinned down to a controlled 
experiment." 
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O'Connor's position is that knowledge and the 
interpretation must be expressed in propositions that 
are publicly testable. By saying that the verification 
of faith cannot be done by the verification of 
propositions Boyce Gibson is on this view saying that 
faith cannot be verified at all. Thus the central 
argument of Boyce Gibson's considerable book is ruled 
inadmissible without further debate. 
149, intention in referring to these three theories 
is not to present an argument for metaphysics though in 
the next chapter I will suggest the line such an 
argument might take. The intention is simply to show 
that O'Connor from the outset refuses to take seriously 
any theory that does not fit into his constricted 
category system. This it seems to me is not a promising 
start to a discussion of basic philosophical issues. 
The analogy of the jigsaw puzzle which accompanies 
the statement on page 112, if it is to be taken 
seriously, demands some comment. Let it be conceded 
that philosophers reshuffle the items of experience into 
a pattern different from one with which they are already 
familiar. What makes the new pattern comprehensible? 
By what criteria is comprehensibility to be determined? 
What makes one comprehensible pattern preferable to 
another? 
When I am trying to complete a jigsaw puzzle X 
can refer either to the picture on the box or I can 
assume that the pieture when finally completed will be 
recognisable. Furthermore the shapes will fit snugly 
into one another, the patterns of small objects,and 
their colours will give me a matching procedure, and 
finally no pieces are missing. But the world is not 
like that at all. X do not know what the final picture 
looks like; some of the pieces are distorted, some 
defaced, some discoloured; many are missing and X have 
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ne way of knowing how many; I do not really know 
the ultimate size or shape of the picture. To make 
O'Connor's analogy meaningful I should need a revelation 
of a transcendental nature, unless of course he is 
implying that we now know the limits of whatever can 
be known. 
Moreover comprehensibility involves a delicate 
and intricate process which operates between "I can't 
see it" and "Ah, now / see" and perhaps between 
"experiencing" and "experiencing as". In "Philosophical 
Investigations" Wittgenstein33 draws attention to the 
ambiguous duck-rabbit shape which you can see either as 
a duck's head facing left or as a rabbit's head facing 
right. Two people, or the same person at different 
times, may perceive the sane narks on paper in 
significantly different ways. Wittgenstein wrote of 
"seeing as"; one sees the picture as a duck or as a 34 rabbit. 	It is possible with Hick to expand this 
notion into that of "experiencing as" not only visually 
but through all the organs of perception together. 
We experience situations in different ways as having 
different Rinds of significance, and sometimes find it 
impossible to experience situations in the same way as 
other people. 
When I look at the puzzle picture and cannot see 
the rabbit but can see the duck, people can help my 
perception by such comments as "those are his ears"; 
but if I eventually do eee the rabbit it would be by ny 
own voluntary, optional, uncompelled effort. The 
important thing in that my perception has changed, my 
level of comprehensibility has been extended, not merely 
by a reshuffling of the items of experience, but by the 
addition to those items of a personal interpretative 
factor. O'Connor's analogy recognises this factor while 
his earlier statement precludes it. 
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There are two further difficulties in this bland 
statement about the "interpretation of experience". 
In formulating any theory about the world I have 
to use words. I am at once confronted with the 
difficulty of bringing everything relevant to the 
surface of language, not just because the universe is 
very big and I am small but because there is a "space" 
between the world (including the world's language) and 
my speaking or writing of it. 	It has been said that 
epistemology describes us only in so far as we are not 
in the world. "Shuffling the items of experience" is 
a misleading metaphor because it suggests that 
"shuffling" is all that goes on; it is however a pregnant 
phrase because it leads to the question, Who does the 
shuffling and where do you stand to do it? 	Put another 
way the question is, What is the reality of that 'space' 
between the world and my speaking of it? 	Can that 
reality be known and if known can it be symbolised? 
O'Connor would answer presunably not that the 'space' 
does not exist but that it cannot emist because he has 
ruled it out of order. 
Wittgenstein, early in his writing, maintained 
that language 'pictured' the world. 35 When we think of 
the world as in some way matching our semantical vehicles 
we parcel up the world into units which correspond with 
the types of senantical vehicles we employ: into things 
for words to refer to; into facts which make our 
sentences true; into classes of things to fit our 
generalisations. 	So language and the world can reflect 
ono another faithfully. 
However, this notion conceives of Language as 
external to the world and immediately we are confronted 
with the difficulty of including language in our study 
of the world and with the further difficulty of studying 
29. 
the relationship between the language and the world of 
experience which it describes. The ultimate "jigsaw" 
which would embrace 'world*, 'language* and the 'space' 
between them is ever receding; the ultimate referent 
which could give comprehensibility to the bits of jigsaw 
which we have, seems of necessity to be transcendent 
at least in some way. Nevertheless if we are ever to 
know this ultimate referent there must also be a way 
to bring it into our ken. 
Karl Popper in "Objective Knowledge" meets the 
issue which I have raised by distinguishing three 
"worlds"; first the world of physical objects or of 
physical states; secondly the world of states of 
consciousness, or of mental states or perhaps of 
behavioural dispositions to act; and thirdly the world 
of objective contents of thought, especially of 
scientific and poetic thoughts and of works of art. 
In his Third World are to be found theoretical systems 
and problem situations, and most importantly critical 
arguments. In many ways this Third World is the 
equivalent of "human language and thought." He maintains 
that this world is objective and autonomous in the same 
sort of way that a book of logarithms produced by a 
computer has an existence of its own irrespective of 
whether it is ever used by human beings. 	He gives as 
analogy the story of a nesting box which he put in his 
garden. It was for a time ignored, then used by a 
family of blue tits for a brief spell before they 
abandoned it. The nesting box may have been abandoned 
prematurely; it might have been capable of improvement; 
it night have been useless. So, argues Popper, is it with 
any theoretical system devised by man. 	Yet the world ° 
of language, of conjectures, theories and arguments - in 
brief the universe of objective RnoWledge - is one of the 
most important of these man-created, yet at the same time 
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largely autonomous, universes. 	He claims that it 
is impossible to understand the human mind and the 
human sell without understanding the Third World. 
"The process of learning, of the growth of 
subjective knowledge is always fundamentally the same. 
It is imaginative criticism. This is how we transcend 
our local and temporal environment by trying to think 
of circumstances.beyond our experience, by criticising 
the universality, or the structural necessity, of what 
may, to us, appear (or what philosophers may describe) 
as the 'given' or as 'habit'; by trying to find, 
construct, invent new situations - that is test situations, 
critical situations; and by trying to locate, detect and 
challenge our prejudices and habitual assunptions." 36 
It would be hard to better these words as a 
description of prophetic insight as displayed in the 
Old Testament, and they carry us far beyond O'Connor's 
definition of knowledge. According to Popper the 
incredible thing about life is the interaction between 
ourselves and our work by which we constantly transcend 
ourselves, our talents and our gifts. 
"This self transcendance is the most striking and 
important fact of all life and all evolution, and 
especially of human evolution." 37 
However for Popper the physical world is an open 
system, 38  and his theory suggests that men wi11 always 
fall short in his understanding of a universe, or 
perhaps three universes, which expand with every creative 
human act. 	This is a very different notion from St. 
Paul's belief that one day we who now see through a glass 
darkly shall see "face to face". 	It seems to me that 
the human striving towards the "Omega" inevitably 
populates the Third World with different formulations 
of the God.aypothesis. 
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I venture to illustrate this point with a 
parable based on ideas from Hick and Mitchell. 
A man out walking one sunny Sunday afternoon finds 
a street he has not noticed before and strolls along it. 
He meets a friend hurrying towards him from the other 
end of the street. "Cone with toe", says the friend 
and both of them turn into an alley leading to a large 
warehouse. Stooping through a small iron door in the 
wall, the man finds himself in a huge darkness, his 
sight surprised by the move out of the bright sunlight. 
However, he does notice in the middle of the floor a 
table with a lamp upon it. Round the table huddles a 
group of men looking like Renbrandtos conspirators; 
they whisper earnestly together. Beyond them he sees 
a prisoner - unbelievable - tied to one of the supporting 
pillars, and a figure standing on guard with some sort 
of machine gun in hand. His friend takes him towards 
the table. He hears snatches of conversation. "We'll 
take over the Post Office 	we'll put men in all 
the main government buildings 	 John and his group 
with all the gear must secure the Broadcast Station .... 
the coup will be so quick people won't realise what's 
happened." 	Sedition, conspiracy, revolution in a 
peaceful democracy! - the man cannot believe it; the 
whole scene is beyond oomprehension. Try as he may, 
even though he knows precisely what he perceives, he 
cannot make sense of it. 	Suddenly, a voice from the 
distance shouts, "Right, cut! That's fine, we'll print." 
And the warehouse is full of light. The man sees 
Cameras and camera crews, and he understands the scene 
which had been so baffling. 
The point I am making is that the *warehouse of 
the world' has no room in it for 'explanatory studio 
equipment'. 
Thus far in the paper I have examined "the logical 
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touchstones" by which O'Connor judges philosophical 
arguments and theories, and have suggested that they 
are stipulative and restrictive to the point of 
intolerance, and that in their elucidation O'Connor is 
guilty of inconsistency for the reasons I have given. 
If it is argued that brief statements of ,a philosophical 
position must of necessity be inadequate, and that 
therefore it is unfair to expect more than a rough sketch, 
the counter argument is in O'Connor's own wordst (p 117) 
"It may be thought absurd to try to examine so 
considerable and controversial a question in the course 
of a few pages. Yet the basic issues are very simple 
and they can easily be stated in quite a summary form." 
The "basic issues" as O'Connor enunciates them 
are not simple and cannot be easily sunmarised except 
with a dogmatism that is unscientific, unphilosophical 
and possibly dangerous. 
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CHAPTER II 
IS METAPHYSICS MEANINGFUL? 
O'Connor begins the second part of this chapter 
with reference to a paper in the Hibbert journal of 
March 1955 by the Professor of Education at the 
University of Hull, E.B. Castle. 	He concedes that 
the paper is interesting and yet he makes no effort to 
counter the argument. 	Rather he takes an illustrative 
allusion to Jacques Maritain as a peg to hang an 
argument on; what follows is more like special pleading 
than an essay in philosophy. 	Castle's point is that at 
no time in our history have we been more convinced about 
the value of education, more feverishly engaged in 
planning and building fine schools, more willing to spend 
money on the training of the young. 	Yet, he asks, are 
we planning with some ultimate end in view, or are we 
engaged in a sparring match with each new economic, 
technological or social problem as it comes along, using 
education only as a means of satisfying immediate needs. 
He asks further whether it is not sad to reflect that 
science and technology in the hands of good and 
intelligent men could now bring to fruit all that 
prophetic religion, stemming from the Hebrew prophets, 
has demanded for the physical welfare of mankind l _if only 
there were the will to perform the task and to re-direct 
our energies. 	What is demanded by the modern situation, 
says Castle, is not that we should ask where we are 
going, but that we should decide where we intend to go. 
Many people would agree with Castle that these are 
not pseudo questions as O'Connor implies that they are 
(p 116). 	Certainly they are questions often asked in 
one form or another. 	Maritain's three questions 
constitute one graphic form, and they should be interpreted 
in the context of the whole article. 	The only fair 
alternative would have been to examine critically 
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Maritain's philosophy as set out in "Distinguer pour 
unir, on Les degres du savoir" first published in 1932 
and translated into English in 1959. 1 	There is no 
evidence in O'Connor's chapter that he has consider0 
Maritain's argument - though he may well have done - 
for there is certainly no discussion of it. 
In a long and complex book Mar itain seeks to show 
that by using a truly critical method and valuing the 
knowledge of "things" the way can be opened to an 
exploration of the world of reflection. 	He insists 
that "Being" can be loosed from the natter in which it 
is incorporated. He concedes that metaphysics is of 
no use in furthering the output of experimental science. 
He concedes that metaphysical truth is "useless" but 
claims it is necessary. 2 	He is developing an argument 
put massively in the late twenties by P.R. Tennant 1 3 more 
modernly by E.L. Mascall4 and more simply by William 
Temple in , Nature, n. and God wherehe argued that . 
the fact the world has, in the course of evolution, given 
rise to minds that reflect on the very process out of 
which they have emerged provides strong justification for 
the belief that the world is itself the product of a 
transcendent Mind. 	The second half of this proposition 
is not relevant. 	But it is very pertinent to ask 
"What are we?", which,is Maritainis first question if 
part of the answer is, "We are transcendental; we can 
apparently stand outside ourselves and the world and 
ask transcendental questions". 	O'Connor's response 
seems to be, "Vou should not do it, because such questions 
cannot be answered by the scientist." Of course he 
might be saying, "the metaphysical phase of man was part 
of the evolutionary process; we are now moving, and with 
profit, into the physical phase." 	But such a view does 
not seem to be supported by the facts. Some people still 
ask the questions raised by Castle in the Hibbert Journal. 
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The reader is told that Maritaings questions 
cannot serve as a starting point for philosophy because 
the questioner wants to hear an answer of a certain Rind; 
what look like questions are really disguised religious 
conclusions, and the questions are spurious (pp 116, 117). 
Of course as Arnaud Reid points out6 if you insist on 
browbeating a pupil to give one answer and no other to a 
question you are only pretending to be seeking a 'best' 
or a 'right' solution. But if some questioners are 
unfair on some occasions it does not follow that the 
questions asked may not be genuine questions, and may 
not be by some people genuinely asked. 	Many responsible 
philosophers believe.that they are important questions 
and that the student, especially the student teacher, 
ought to put such questions to himself. He will be more 
honest if he is open to their possible profundity than 
if he dismisses them for Professor O'Connor's reasons 
as having only a "ring of profundity" (p 115). 
He dismisses the third question "Where ought we 
to be going?" as a "variant of those ethical questions 
of value that we discussed in Chapter 3" without the 
slightest hint that it follows naturally from the other 
two questions, 	Leaving aside for the moment the 
confusion between axiology, ethics (or meta ethics) and 
morals (or normative ethics) we can look briefly at 
some questions raised in the third chapter. They 
include, "What things are good as ends?", "How are we to 
find out what things are good (as ends or means)?", "Is 
this particular action x wrong or right?", "Are actions_ 
of type A wrong or right?", "Why is this so?" (pp 54,55,69). 
Such questions emphasize the significance of the word 
"ought" in the original question. O'Connor's quiet 
acceptance of the word "ought" is remarkable. He is 
conceding that men can have aims in life and that they 
can choose between one aim and another; but more than 
that he is stating that men have an "obligation" to 
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pursue those aims they believe to be "better". This 
is a very large concession and it surely validates the. 
first question of Maritain's which in part now becomes, 
"What sort of beings are we that we should have these 
notions of "ultimate purpose", "choice", and "obligation"." 
If O'Connor tells me (p 115) that I am a middle class 
Australian in the twentieth century with a certain 
biological and psychological structure and a determining 
heredity and race history surely I may reasonably reply, 
"that's fine, I now_know where I am going because it 
has been determined, and really I have no choice even 
though I may think that I choose; I must go where I am 
going and I do not quite understand your use of the word 
"ought". " 	If on the other hand he tells me "you are 
just a fortuitous concourse of atoms", then I might 
reasonably reply, "then it doesn't matter where r an 
going." 
In other words he cannot logically admit the 
validity of the third question without admitting the 
validity of the first. 	The second question, as 
O'Connor perceives, relates to the temporal state in 
which men find themselves, and arises from the mystery 
of "carpe diem" which has puzzled and provoked thinkers 
and artists throughout the story of mankind. All three 
questions are interdependent and as originally framed 
contained the plural pronoun. Maritain WAS conscious 
of another factor, that man is a social animal. It is 
unfortunate, to say the least, that O'Connor sees fit to 
change the form of the question so that this additional 
cause of puzzlement is lost. 
In his facile treatment of Castle's paper which 
makes up Part II of this final chapter, O'Connor seems 
not to distinguish between the contemplation of one 
single object or other and the contemplation of the 
world taken as a whole, or more satisfactorily, one's 
entire experience of the world taken •as a 'Whdle. 
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What is being asked is how shall we uperceive"the 
world? 	With this in mind one night conceive of 
metaphysics as a conspectus, nap, grid, slant or model; 
as a framework upon which we rationally arrange and 
structure our worldly experience taken as a whole, into 
some meaningful unity; as a rational synopsis of all our 
experience. Or one night conceive of metaphysics as 
the linguistic formulation of a conspectus of the world 
which appears to have explanatory value, and perhaps 
heuristic significance. Or one might conceive of 
metaphysics as a 'projection' in the sense in which a 
cartographer uses the term, recognising the difficulty 
of translating into a particular medium what cannot 
properly be expressed in that medium„ John Wisdom 
explores this possibility in his celebrated paper "Gods" 
in which he relates the parable of the garden to show 
how an explanatory hypothesis may start by being 
experimental and gradually become something quite 
different. 7 	Anthony Flew replied with a similar 
parable in his essay "Theology and Palsification" 8 and 
there has been considerable discussion of Wisdom's position 
since, much of it prior to the publication of O'Connor's 
book although a greater amount since. 	It is not within 
the scope of this paper to review this discussion but its 
existence should be noted, and might have been commented 
on by O'Connor who so sweepingly and authoritatively 
rejects metaphysical questions. 	However / wish to 
revert briefly to the notion of ofalsifiability' referred 
to earlier. 
Dr. Heinbeck9 has pointed out that for Karl Popper 
falsifiability was a criterion for demarcating scientific 
theories from non scientific; it was never a criterion 
of meaning as A.G.N. Flew wade it. i° John. ,Wilson puts 
the case in this wayll 
"If a statement is not decisively falsifiable, in 
principle as well as in practice, then the statement 
is not informative." 
If the truth of a statement is consistent with any 
evidence that might be forthcoming it is argued that 
such a statement cannot be informative. To say, 
"There is a tiger in the kitchen and nothing that 
happens could falsify the truth of that statement" is 
clearly nonsense. On the face of it falsification is 
the obverse of verification and Flew has used it 
powerfully in this way to ask, "What could falsify the 
existence of God?" 12  But it would be rash to assume 
that verification and falsification must always be 
related in a synmatrical fashion. John Hick 13 has 
pointed out that the proposition "there are three 
successive sevens in the decimal determination of Tr “ 
has not yet been verified so far as the value of Tr 
has been worked out. 	But it will always be true 
that such a series may occur at a point not yet 
calculated. 	So the proposition nay one day be 
verified if it is true, but cannot be falsified if it 
is false. 
Nevertheless, just as O'Connor argues that 
religious claims cannot be verified, Flew and others 
argue that they cannot be falsified and are therefore 
vacuous. 	In rejecting this argument I would make 
two points. 
First, as Warnock13 and Waismann14 have shown 
crucial utterances of science are not open to any final 
falsification. 	Secondly, there is a tendency to 
conflate evidence with criteria, to confuse the grounds 
for believing a statement to be true or false (the 
checking conditions) with the conditions which would 
actually make a statement true or false (the truth 
conditions). 	In his book "Falsification and Belief"15 
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Alastair McKinnon argues strongly against Flew's 
position and towards the end of the work has this to 
say: 
"This answer may become clearer if we begin by 
asking why anyone should adopt.the scientist's. 
fundamental use of "order" and, more generally, his 
characteristic attitude toward the world. Of course, 
there are cultural, pragmatic and even personal reasons 
for doing so but these, we have agreed, are now beside 
the point. 	The question is not that of the causes 
which might prompt one to adopt this attitude but rather 
the reasons or defences he might legitimately offer for 
doing so. Put thus, the answer seems quite plain. 
There is no absolute justification for the adoption of 
this attitude but one who is committed to the enterprise 
of understanding can conditionally justify this choice 
on the ground that science is the most disciplined 
expression of the human attempt to understand what is 
usually referred to as the world in which we live. 
Though he cannot finally justify his commitment to 
understanding, he can appeal to this commitment to 
justify his adoption of the scientific attitude. The 
situation appears to be very similar in the case of 
religious belief. There is no absolute and unconditional 
justification for belief as such. The believer may 
adopt a religious approach to the world but there is no 
argument by which he can rationally compel others to do 
likewise. Be can, however, defend his position as 
following from his commitment to the enterprise of under-
standing and he can argue that those who reject it confess 
thereby that, to this extent, they have forsaken this 
enterprise. The justification for belief is like that 
of science; in both cases it is finally conditional. 
But there is one important difference. While both 
science and religion aim at an understanding of reality, 
the former, by its own nature and admission, is content 
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with a limited and restricted account while the latter 
continues to strive for a total and unrestricted 
interpretation. Its drive for understanding is in 
every way more comprehensive and ambitious. It follows, 
therefore, that the commitment which really justifies 
the adoption of the scientific attitude points yet more 
strongly to the acceptance of religious belief." 
O'Connor does not share this view and in the third 
section of his chapter he seeks to show that theological 
statements are not meaningful and therefore should have 
no place in education. 
"religious beliefs do not admit of rational 
support and are therefore immune to rational criticism.... 
they cannot be of any concern for rational enquiry, for 
they cannot be either communicated or demonstrated" (p 125) 
As illustration of his thesis O'Connor discusses the 
Teleological Argument as formulated in Aquinas' Five 
Ways. The result is a loss of clarity in the argument 
and a failure to deal adequately with the very complex 
issues raised. 	Since O'Connor. takes the Argument from 
Design first, I shall follow him, even though the 
contention that theological statements are meaningless 
is the larger issue. 
O'Connor follows David Hume who in the posthumously 
published Dialogues on Natural Religion subjected the 
argument to detailed scrutiny. His criticisms might be 
summed up in this way. First the argument involves 
comp4ring the whole universe to an artefact "which we 
know, on other grounds, to be designed for a purpose" 
(p 119). But, says Hume, why single out human artefacts. 
If we are comparing the whole universe to a small section 
of the,items within it, that is comparing the whole to, 
a part, why not select some other part? For instance, 
the cosmos seems as much like a vegetable as it is like 
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a machine. But then the analogy of human artefacts 
breaks down; potatoes are not in our experience 
designed by men. The way O'Connor presents this first 
criticism is slightly different. He raises the point 
that if we ask a question "What is X designed for?" we 
are begging the important question which has first to 
be asked, "Is this X designed for a purpose at all?" (p 120) 
"The basic fault of such questions as, What is the 
purpose of man? and What is the meaning of life? is that 
they beg the more fundamental question, Is the Universe 
designed and created for a purpose?" 
Here he stops, when he might have strengthened his 
argument by reference to Hume's other three points. 
His second was that even if we accept the machine 
analogy there is no necessity to postulate one Maker. 
Whereas a savage.might infer from a canoe the intentions 
of one craftsman, a sophisticated person would infer 
from a great and complex ship a host of craftsmen and 
designers. So the cosmos night have been the work of 
a committee of gods. 
Thirdly the Argument is anthropormorphic. The 
more we make the Author of Nature like the Designer of 
a machine the more we make God like man. The stronger 
the argument the more blasphemous our conception of God. 
Fourthly, Hume noted the problem of evil. If 
orderliness and purpose are the pointers to a Creator 
then evil and disorderliness must be counted as 
counter evidence. 
In preference to pursuing Hume's argument O'Connor 
takes up a point made by Kant in, his 'Critique of 
Practical Reason - . If, he said, we observe a chain of 
means and ends in nature it is wrong to think that this 
indefinitely extended chain could ever be experienced 
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in all its completeness. The Being which is postulated 
as the ultimate cause of the chain lies beyond all 
possible experience: and such a Being can never enter 
into a system of scientific knowledge. 
O'Connor, no doubt with Hums and Kant in mind, 
turns to his prior question, "Is the Universe designed 
for a purpose?" 	He rejects an affirmative answer on 
two grounds. 
"Suppose it were true that all processes directed by 
intelligent beings involve adaptation of means to ends. 
It would still not follow that all adaptation of means 
to ends was the work of intelligence." Op 121) 
"We have no possible means of applying a test for 
intelligent design to those phenomena which display 
adaptation of means to ends but are not already known 
on other grounds to be planned" ( p 121) 
The elaboration of these arguments leads him to the 
conclusion: 
"We have, soon how this question is to be treated. 
And this, though it does not give us the answer, does 
give us,a reason for ceasing to ask the question" (p 123) 
However, it seems to me that he reaches this conclusion 
by way of an inadequate argument. 
The original question concerns the universe and 
Aquinas appeals to a highly general example of 
purposiveness seen in the fact that material, non-
intelligent, multifarious things 'co-operatet_in 
producing a stable world order and stable sub-systems 
which 'work' in a regular and mutually dependent way. 
It WAS Paley who stressed biological adaptation rather 
than cosmic orderliness and O'Connor seems to have 
confused the two arguments. The analogy with the 
machine to whith he refers needs to be given its full 
significance. A machine has three relevant characteristics. 
Pirst, it is a complex of interacting parts. We do not 
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call an ashtray a machine even though it is an artefact 
designed for a particular purpose. 	Second, the 
machine has a specific effect or function. Third, it 
is planned and produced by intelligent human beings. 
O'Connor refers to the last two of these characteristics 
but not to the first one when he refers back to the 
universe. Ile quotes the teleological arguer: 
“We may therefore conclude that the universe which 
shows so many of these adaptations is the outcome of 
intelligent planning and that it is the work of a 
designer." (p 120) 
But this is not a correct presentation of the basic 
argument which is rather that the cosmos can be regarded 
as a complex whole made up of interacting parts and in 
its orderliness and regularity resembles a machine. 
As it is hard to conceive of a machine existing without 
authorship so it is hard to conceive of the universe 
existing without authorship. 	Of course one might well 
attempt a description of how a complex ordered whole 
cones into existence out of a more chaotic state, as men 
have done in seeking to account for the solar system. 
But as Ninian Smart has pointed out 16 it is necessary 
in order to elaborate such theories to refer to existing 
regularities; any explanation depends on the theorist's, 
knowledge of the laws of nature. There is, as it were, 
a premiss of orderliness upon which the theory rests 
which attempts to explain the transition from the 
chaotic to the orderly. The emergence of the organised 
out of the relatively chaotic implies that even the 
relatively chaotic is not complete chaos. 	so that to 
explain orderliness we must presuppose some degree of 
orderliness. 	And hero we reach the point of dilemma 
which itself prompts the question that O'Connor wishes 
not to be asked. We find that we cannot explain the 
origin of the ordered cosmos as a whole in terns of a 
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prior orderliness; a prior pattern of events governed 
by regularities; for such a pattern would be part of 
the cosmos which we are trying to explain. 	Either 
we say, as O'Connor implicitly says, that there can be 
no explanation of the universe's orderliness, or we can 
say that the only explanation would be non-scientific. 
Part of the reason for asking the question, "Is 
the Universe designed for a purpose?" is the very fact 
that we are confronted with the dilemma described in 
the previous paragraph. 	It is part of the problem 
that "we could never test the rest of the material" in 
the way we conduct scientific experiments. Nevertheless 
we find ourselves able to conceive the idea of the 
universe as a whole constituted by a vast pattern of 
interacting events in space-time. 	We recognise a 
resebblance to a highly complex machine and we frame our 
question accordingly, fully aware that a scientific 
answer is not possible. 
What does not logically follow is that we could 
never know the answer to the question, or that some day 
any answer might not be 'verified' in a manner appropriate 
to the context of the question. 	Meanwhile to say, 	as 
O'Connor does, that it "is a very bad piece of reasoning" 
to frame our question in terms which have made sense of 
our environment and experience thus far, seems an 
exaggeration. 	It would be rather silly to say that 
within our world we recognise the role of man in imposing 
orderliness and regularity, but when we consider the 
universe as a whole as being orderly we will be wrong to 
begin from the tentative knowledge which we have. The 
point ofcourse is not_that the Argument from Design proves 
the existence of God - no philosopher of religion has ever 
said so. Aqt.inast Five Ways and the other arguments 
presented by the philosophers of religion are added 
together to suggest that the postulation of a 
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God-hypothesis is a reasonable one. 	As John Wisdom 
remarked, these arguments operate not like the links 
in a chain but as the legs of a chair. 17 
One would have expected from a philosopher some 
cognisance of the philosophy of religion, and some 
recognition that many writers (vide B.L. Nhscall in 
Bei/act-1 ) 18 `jThe Openness of 	have examined the validity 
of natural theology in the light of philosophical 
analysis and that their arguments are much more 
"profound" than O'Connor gives credit for. It is 
difficult to avoid the feeling that he is putting up 
skittles which are fairly readily knocked down. 
Arnaud Reid in his review makes this point very strongly 
when he uses the phrase "scandalously unfair". 
The larger issue discussed in Section I/I is 
whether theological statements are 'rational'; whether 
they are admissible in rational discussion. He 
concludes that they are not (pp 123-126), and for this 
reason are to be excluded from any educational programme. 
Almost at the same time as the publication of the 
book under discussion there was also published a book 
oFaith and Logic-" in which there was a careful and 
sensitive examination of the bearing of modern 
philosophy upon Christian faith. The book WAS intended 
"as a contribution to a continuing debate" and there have 
been many essays and collections of essays since in which 
this debate has been continued. 	In other words the 
conclusion reached by O'Connor and 'wished' by him upon 
his readers has not been widely accepted by those whose 
major concern has been philosophy or theology. The 
question is not closed but open. 	One of the essays 
in the book. Faith and Logic which has itself led to a 
considerable literature is 'The possibility of Theological 
Statements" by 1.1% Crombie, and in dealing with the last 
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pages of Section /II I shall refer to his argument. 
He makes the point very early: 
"My procedure will be to ignore the loose statement 
of the case (the doctrine that unverifiable statements 
are meaningless is. like the doctrine that cars are fast; 
not entirely false, but blanketing so many important 
distinctions as to be useless)". 20 
He concedes that theological statements have the 
paradoxical features ascribed to them by their opponents 
but denies that paradox demonstrates a lack of meaning; 
rather, it illuminates the meaning by characterising 
the subject natter. 	We have already been confronted 
with a paradox in considering the nature of the universe. 
If there is that which explains the orderliness of the 
total cosmos it cannot be part of the cosmos or it would 
become merely a part of what we are seeking to explain. 
If it is not part of the cosmos its existence nay not 
be "publicly tested" in the way that parts of the conics 
may be scrutinised, and yet there are those who insist 
that this is the only permissible way to attest the 
'existence' of anything. 
As I have already indicated, theological statements - 
and I assume this is what O'Connor loosely refers to as 
'religion' - are about a nystery, yet they do bear some 
relationship to utterances that are not theological, and 
the sense of mystery itself may be seen to be an 
appropriate response to parts of our experience. 
O'Connor's position is that, while he admits the right 
of people to hold religious beliefs, he claims that these 
beliefs constitute a system that exists without any 
reference to things in the real world. If it is asked 
"what was his purpose in changing his job?" (p 119) 
O'Connor could understand and accept answers like, "he . 
wanted to earn more money", or "he wanted more free time", 
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or "he wanted more congenial work" but he would 
presumably not accept "he wanted to do the will of God" 
because that is a reason which would be impossible to 
check. A question like "What is the will of God for 
him?" would produce ambiguous statements; clarification 
of the concept 'will of God' would be elusive. But, 
argues Crombie, it is this very elusiveness which is a 
consequence, indeed an expression, of the fact that all 
theological statements_are about God, and that God is 
not part of the spatio-temporal world, but is in 
intimate relation with it. 
Statements about God are to be interpreted as if 
their subject was a particular individual and yet they 
differ in logical character from all other statements 
about particular individuals. 	It should be noted that 
seeing God is neither technically impossible nor 
logically impossible as going to Neptune is technically 
impossible or seeing the average man is logically 
impossible; it is theologically impossible. 
Secondly statements about God are claimed to be 
true and are claimed to have determinate meaning, and 
yet the theist seems not to regard himself as embroiled 
in scientific dispute; he seems to claim an immunity which 
belongs only to those who do not make statements of fact. 
If it is true that "God loves men" then there is nothing 
which can happen to any man that would falsify that 
statement. 	If "God made the world" it is impossible 
to conceive what the world might be like if God did not 
make it. 
Both these situations are inevitable for the 
theologian but are anathema for the critical empiricist. 
For Crotbie the major contribution of natural theology 
is not the proof of God which he says "cannot be 
acconplished". 21 	What natural theology does do is to 
reveal the intellectual pressures which lead intelligent 
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people into the anomalies already referred to. As / 
have already indicated, human beings do not accept the 
idea that they are ordinary spat io-temporal objects, 
and since they find themselves as it were "standing 
beyond the universe" they have no real difficulty in 
postulating a God-hypothesis. 	Indeed the special 
concepts needed for coping with human experience, 
'love', 'hope', 'faith', 'obligation', have a relative 
independence of space, and are thought of in quite a 
different way from 'walking' or 'digesting'. 
"If God exists, He is unique, and if other beings 
are related to Him, that relation is also unique 	 
Now if this is so t by what sort of reasoning could the - 
existence of God possibly be proved? 	Neither lie nor 
the world's relation to Him can be made the instance of 
a rule, as has been shown ad nauseam by those who 
criticise the Causal Argument 	 the demand for a 
First Cause is a demand for an instance of the genus 
'cause', and the activity of God being unique is at best 
an analogy of that genus, but not an instance of it. „22  
It has been argued that the notion of transcendance 
is a loophole23 and that either 'God' stands for some-
thing at least partly within our experience so that 
statements with the word 'God' in them are to that extent 
experimentally verifiable: or else 'God' does not stand 
for something.within our actual or potential experience 
in which case, to put it bluntly, statements about God 
can have no possible interest for us and may well be 
meaningless. 	But this is really too slick a dilemma. 
As ncPherson has reminded us24 religious people have a 
real, often overwhelming experience which is extremely 
difficult to explain and to this extent religion may be 
'inexpressible' without being meaningless. At the same 
time men have to find words to declare their religion 
and if there is_a dilemma it is the requirement to 
express the non-rational (or super-rational) in rational 
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place upon them entirely different patterns. The 
dialectic between philosophers may result in greater 
wisdom for all and perhaps a new interpretation. 
To the extent that O'Connor contributes to this 
service of linguistic philosophy he must be praised. 
But it is unfortunate that the tone of this section is 
intellectually sceptical: "you can believe if you want 
but your faith is not reasonable and cannot be. validated." 
The position as I see it 10 rather that faith is 
reasonable for some people, or for some people at some 
times, but not for other people at other times. It is 
possible for people to come to believe on adequate 
grounds. The crucial point is that there is no 'across 
the board' answer as to what constitutes adequate 
grounds; criteria have to be established separately for 
each different sUbject matter. 	Moreover the 
reasonableness of a belief depends on what data a ran 
has at his disposal. In 1474 it would have been 
unreasonable to believe that one could in England see 
and listen to a man on the underside of the earth. It 
is in principle quite possible for a person to have 
participated in experiences on the basis of which it is 
reasonable for him to believe in God (and even unreasonable 
not to) while another person who has not had these 
experiences may with equal reason not believe in God. 
In such a situation it seems to me quite reasonable for 
the believer to invite the non-believer to attempt to 
share his experiences and to examine the reasons behind 
his belief, and equally proper for the nonbeliever to 
indicate the reasons for his non-belief. In the field 
of education these attitudes should be both. seen as 
positive attitudes. Religion is not extra, it is 
interpretative. O'Connor's Positivist view is also 
interpretative. Writing on this point Foster states: 33 
"We are witnessing the disappearance of metaphysics 
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and its replacement by - what? It is not true that nothing 
has stepped into the place which metaphysics has vacated. 
What has stepped in is what I have called by the vague 
name of 'humanism'.. This is not an empirical natter 
as we have seen. The choices and stipulations with 
which it is concerned are not datable acts of individual 
human beings. To call it a humanist metaphysics would 
stress the fact that the old metaphysics has been 
replaced by something which is so to speak on the same 
level as itself, but it would be misleading because we 
do not use the name 'metaphysics' to describe the kind 
of thing which it is. 	In some ways humanist myth 
would be a better descriPtion." 
What Professor O'Connor has in fact done is to 
give a sunnary and sonewhat disjointed answer to 
Maritain's three questions, What are we?, Where are we?, 
and Where are we going? 	In giving reasons for his 
answer he has the same difficulties as I have in giving 
reasons for my answer, and both our answers must be open 
to scrutiny and to amendment. 	The difference between 
us is that I recognise the metaphysical nature of my 
arguments; he fails to see the metaphysical nature of his. 
I turn now to the fourth section in which O'Connor 
considers the relationship between religion and uoralitY. 
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CHAPTER III 
ETHICAL JUDGEMENTS  
In the fourth section, O'Connor discusses the 
relationship between ethics and religion: what he calls 
the "nature of the connexion between morality and 
religion" (p'126). 	He concedes, belatedly I think, 
that religion is a vague concept and defines the term 
as incorporating code, cult, and creed; and he asks 
whether a moral code can exist without a religious 
setting. 	However, he uses 'morality' and its cognates 
without clarifying the concept and it is therefore hard 
to follow the process of his argument. 
Most careful modern philosophers would distinguish 
between three branches of "ethics". 	First there are 
moral questions: for example, "Is the teaching of 
religion in schools wrong?" 	Secondly, there are 
questions of fact about people's moral opinions: for 
example, "Who believes that the teaching of religion in 
schools is wrong?" 	Thirdly, there are questions about 
the meaning of moral words or about the nature of moral 
concepts: for example "What is one saying if one says, 
the teaching of religion in schools is wrong?" 	The 
first branch would normally be called "morals" or 
"normative ethics"; the second branch would be called 
"descriptive ethics"; and the third branch would be 
called the "logic of ethics" or "netaethics" or most 
commonly "ethics". 	A philosopher needs to distinguish 
clearly the kind of moral statement he is making. 
O'Connor asks 
"What we want to know is whether an effective moral code 
, can exist apart from a religious setting  ? (p 126) 
and he answers "It would be possible for a man to hold 
to a set of moral rules without holding any supporting 
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religious beliefs." (p 127) 
Here he appears to be discussing morals, so that 
when he concludes on page 137 that morality has an 
essential link with education he seems to be saying that 
it is right to teach morals in school but wrong to teach 
religion. 	However he states on page 127 
"We are concerned here only with the claim that 
the validity of moral judgements needs to be guaranteed 
by the truths of religion" 	and on page 129 
"Anyone who argues from statements about religion 
to statements about moral values argues from premisses 
which do not contain value concepts to statements which 
do" and on page 137 
"1 have been concerned here only with the claim 
that education has a necessary basis in ethics and 
religion." 
These statements look like ethical statements 
and he seems to be asking whether ethical statements are 
coterminous with theological statements. His reference 
to Hume and his recapitulation of arguments set out 
on page 59 confirm that O'Connor is arguing that moral 
statements are not derived from theological statements. 
But it should be realised that the Humean argument, 
refined by 'bore, is basically that one cannot derive 
an "ought" from an "is". If this is so then another 
question is raised: "Where are such statements, derived?" 
Using O'Connor's rather misleading terminology, the 
question is, "Where do moral codes cone from if they do , 
not come from religion?" 	Or the question might be put, 
"Of what nature are ethical judgements?" 	This is a 
question he neither clarifies nor attempts to answer, 
despite his reference to the "validity of moral judgements." 
His statement that any man, religious or not, can hold to 
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a set . ofmoral rules te ambiguous and unhelpful. 
Everyone, including the Criminal, has a moral code of 
some sort and I doubt if the fact has ever been disputed. 
Ethical jUdgements become significant when moral codes 
are compared when the morality of one action is judged 
against the morality of another action. 	He says on 
page 137 that the purposes which motivate men may be 
trivial and selfish, but they "ought" not to be. But 
What,is.the significance of this "ought"? How would 
O'Connor answer 4 crude disciple of Am :Rand who claimed 
that human purposes should be selfish? Nowhere in this 
section 4s there an attempt to deal with the nature of 
ethical judgements or even an attempt to indicate that 
his dismissal of religion demands some alternative. 
The reader must be content with a comment on page 71 
"tleproblem of how to justify our value judgements is 
still an unpolved problem of philosophy." 
Of course when O'Connor states that a man can hold to 
a set of moral rules without holding any supporting 
religious beliefs he is probably assuming a high moral 
standard and expressing the view , that a man can behave 
himself well whether he is relic; ious or not. Again I 
doubt if this has over been disputed. 	The confusion 
arises because he has mixed up two questions, "where 
does the moral code come from?" and "where does the 
strength of character to keep the moral code come from?" 
What O'Connor seems to want to say is this. A 
man can be good without being religious. Educators 
should want their educands to be good, and that involves 
the teaching of morals. Religion ehopld not be taught 
because it cannot be "publicly tested", but its omission 
need not stop the teaching of morals. 	The work of the 
Farmington Trust is based on this axiom and in their 
book' uIntroduction to Moral Educations' John Wilson puts 
the case more clearly. 	It is not at all clear from 
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this chapter what is meant by "morality" and how it is 
to be related to education. 	This is an important 
question and should have been clarified. For if it is 
wrong to teach, "If God so loved us, ought we not also 
to love one another?" it is also wrong to teach, "You 
should not have intercourse with your girl friend in 
the Sixth Porn" because the truth of that statement 
cannot be "publicly attested" either. What is to 
determine which moral code shall be taught? 
In fact he raises an even more complex problem. 
"I have been concerned here only with the claim 
that education has a necessary basis in ethics and 
religion and that it is the task of philosophy to 
justify this claim by making clear the character of the 
connexion. I believe that it is true that morality has 
this essential link with education but that it is false 
that religion is relevant at all." (p 137) 
It would appear from this statement that O'Connor has 
been concerned to show that words like "ought", "should", 
"right" and "good" have a place in educational theory. 
But in fact he has not discussed this matter at all, 
and he certainly has not indicated how the terms could 
be derived. Two questions have been conflated and 
neither has been answered: "What 'morality' ought to be 
taught?" and "What of anything ought to be taught and 
him-P t In an introduction to Philosophy.one would not 
expect a complete attempt to answer them, but at least 
in this chapter one would have expected some hint as to 
how the questions might be tackled. 
It could be argued that a descriptive approach to 
ethics would be both instructive and helpful without 
being indoctripatorY. But then too it could also be 
held that a descriptive approach to, religion could be 
ecuallv acceptable. 	The difficulty arises when a 
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teacher is contemplating the possibility of being 
prescriptive. 	Indeed this seems to me to be the 
true locus of debate not only in religion and ethics 
but in politics, aesthetics, and social mores: how far 
should a teacher be prescriptive? It might have been 
beneficial if O'Connor had included some discussion of 
this issue in his book. 
What he has done is to raise the autonowy,of 
ethics as the substantial issue in this section, and by 
doing so he has brought into question the justification 
of any evaluative judgement. 	The intention is to 
show that there is no necessary connexion between ethics 
and religion: that ethical judgements can neither be re-
duced without residuum to judgements that fall within 
theology, nor can they bededuced formally from such 
judgements either. 	The effect is to remind us that 
ethical judgements cannot formally be deduced from any 
judgements or propositions that are 'empirical' in 
O'Connor's meaning of that term. Hare has written2 
"Let us suppose that someone claims that he can deduce 
a moral or other evaluative judgement from a set of 
purely factual or descriptive premises, relying on some 
definition to the effect that V (a value word) means the 
same as C (a conjunction of descriptive predicates). 
We first have to ask hip to be sure that C contains, no 
expression that is covertly evaluative (for example, 
'natural', 'normal', fsatafying 0 or 'fundamental human 
needs'). 	Nearly all so-called2naturalistic definitions" 
will break down under this test - for to be genuinely 
naturalistic a definition must contain no expression for 
whose applicability there is not a.definite criterion
•which does not involve the making of a value judgement. 
If the definition satisfies this test, we have next to 
ask whether its advocate ever wishes to commend anything 
for being C 	for his definition has made this 
impossible." 
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Furthermore, if ethical concepts were to be 
defined in terms of non-ethical concepts, these would 
be the fundamental ones. 	Since all derivative 
concepts must be definable in terms of the fundamental 
ones, the whole content of ethics would be reduced to 
something non-ethical. 
O'Connor has argued throughout the book that the 
empiricist approach, especially through science, has 
been immensely successful in providing knowledge about 
the nature of things. 	He has argued that what we 
cannot "know" using empirical tests cannot be known. 
One would expect him for this reason to argue• that if 
we are to discover a morality that is incontrovertible 
we have to use scientific means to discover it, and 
scientific definitions to explain our discoveries; if 
this is not possible then he needs to justify the 
inclusion of ethics in an educational programme. 
By his silence in this chapter O'Connor confirms 
the view that he sees Ethics as basically emotivist as 
he explains it in the third chapter; although he 
disclaims the position it is hard to avoid the opinion 
that he is subjectivist and relativist. This makes it 
all the harder to understand why he allows 'morals' to 
remain in the ambit of education. 	No ethical statement 
is 'publicly testable' nor can it be deduced from a 
proposition that is 'publicly testable'; surely then such 
statements can no more be admissible in the language of 
the educator than the statements of the theologian. 
It is hard to understand why he does not admit the complex 
problems in this area even if he is not prepared in the 
space available to argue them. 
There is something peculiar about an ethical 
judgement that marks it off from all other kinds of 
statement. 	When I say "A is good" I imply A claim 
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that * "A is good" can be objectively and rationally 
justified or validated.* 
An ethical judgement claims that it will stand 
up under scrutiny by oneself and others in the light of 
the most careful thinking and the best knowledge, and 
that rival judgements will not stand up under such 
scrutiny. 
David Hume makes the point in Part I of his 
Enquiry into the Principles of Morals: 
"The notion of morals implies some sentiment 
common to all mankind, which recommends the same 
object to general approbation •... When a man denominates 
another his *enemy*, *rival*, *antagonist*, *adversary* 
he is understood to speak the language of self-love, and 
to express sentiments, peculiar to himself, and arising 
from his own particular circumstance and situation. 
But when he bestows on any man the epithets of *vicious* 
or *odious* or *depraved* he then speaks another 
language and expresses sentiments, in which he expects 
all his audience are to concur with him. He must here.... 
depart from his private and particular situation and 
must choose a point of viola, common to himself and 
others. -  3 
In fact we have to 
"invent a peculiar set of terns, in order to 
express those universal sentiments of censure or 
approbation" . 4 
Such a language of public dialogue recognises the 
claim to objective validity. This ability of ethical 
statements to stand on their feet I shall return to. 
There is plainly not such an autonomy about ethics_ 
that it is altogether independent of factual judgements - 
that would be absurd. 
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We judge what we ought to do because of what the 
situation is or what it seems to us to be. We judge 
something to be good or bad because of its factual 
nature. 	In this kind of way ethical judgements are 
based on natters of fact. 	The man must be kicking 
the,dog, and without a sufficient reason, before we can 
say, "that's bad!" 
However, granting this dependence, autonomy is 
still preserved because from no factual proposition 
whatever can we infer that things which have certain 
properties will be intrinsically good or bad. 
Similarly, from factual propositions alone we cannot 
infer that any act of a given kind in a given situation 
will be morally right or wrong. 
It is clear then that the Autonomy of Ethics, 
though it excludes certain views as to the relation 
between ethics and theology or between ethics and natural 
science, need not deny any and every kind of relation 
between ethics and these other disciplines. I would 
briefly refer to one such relation. 
In our keenness to separate Ethics from Theology 
it is not always remembered that "God" is ordinarily a 
"partially-moral" term. In our civilization and thus 
in our language, it would not be strictly proper to call 
a being "God" whose actions were not perfectly good or 
whose commands were not the best of moral directives. 
That God is good is.a truth of language, and not an 
ethical contingency, since one of the usual criteria of 
Godhead is that the actions and commands of such a being 
are perfectly good. In referring to some being as "God" 
we would in part be saying that hd,is morally faultless. 
When we say "God is good" we are nOt making a moral 
judgement; that would be either redundant or impertinent. 
We are making a commitment, a response to the revelation 
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of the Holy. . Without some such commitment it would 
be impossible to even approach the moral standard we 
set for ourselves. The commitment may be theistic 
or it may be atheistic; I think that is generally 
conceded. But the nature of that commitment is, 
submit, impossible to define in physical terms, and by 
saying that an unbeliever can be 'moral', meaning that 
he can maintain high standards in behaviour and attitude, 
O'Connor surreptitiously introduces this concept of 
commitment without attempting to analyse, the concept. 
If a man commits himself to moral values, or indeed to 
values in other fields, and believes these values to be 
in some way objective, then it is clear that the values 
do not proceed from the subjective desires and choices 
of human beings. Prom whence then do they arise? 
It cannot, for reasons already given, be said that the 
moral law arises from material causes. If it comes 
neither from the,material world nor from the world of 
conscious beings, is there not a prima facie case for 
saying that the source of moral value is beyond the 
world: that the source is transcendent? It is not the 
purpose of this paper to argue the case but simply to 
suggest that there is a case to be argued. O'Connor 
ignores it. 
His thesis has been that a proposition can only 
be true or false if it can be verified in accordance 
with the procedures which are acceptable in Science. 
I want now to look at this thesis in relation to moral 
judgements. 
Whether any judgement is true or false always 
depends in some way on its relation to a reality which 
is not itself a set of judgements or 'propositions'. 
In this sense the correspondence theory is obviously true. 
But it would seem important not to bring the concept 
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of 'copying' into 'correspondence'. It may not be 
reasonable to demand a separate fact for every true 
judgement. 
Is it a distinct fact that there is a Tasmanian 
graduate. in this room where I am writing? 	Another 
that there is a man in this room? Another that there 
is a musician in this room? Another that there is a 
Tasmanian graduate living in may suburb? 
Is it a distinct fact that there are no Tasmanian 
tigers in this room, nor are there male Indian 
elephants? 
If it is not so, then we shall say that the 
proposition" 'truth' consists in correspondence to 
'facts" is not an acceptable definition. 
Similarly, if I say this lump of sugar is 
soluble, an / asserting the existence in the lump of 
an actual quality, "solubility", which is there even 
when the sugar is not exposed to water. 
If I say, "the match will take place if the rain 
stops", how does the truth of this hypothetical state-
ment derive from its direct correspondence to facts? 
Perhaps we can concede that what the Correspondence 
Theory does, as opposed to pragmatist or coherence 
theories, is to insist that the truth of a judgement is 
dependent on reality. 	However, the mode of dependence 
may be different as regards different kinds of judgement. 
Descriptive affirmative empirical judgements are 
directly rendered true by the possession of a quality 
or relation by the thing or things to which it is 
attributed. "I have a black pen" is true because 
there is actually a pen in my hand and it is black. 
Contra-factual conditionals an the other hand are 
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not made true because they correspond to some 
hypothetical fact, but rather by the nature of 
existent things which is such as to imply that if 
things had been different in way A they would have 
been different in way B. 
"I would have had this paper printed, had time and 
money allowed" if true, is true not because the paper 
is actually printed in some hypothetical sense, but 
because my nature is such and my practice has been such 
to give credence to the proposition. 
"The submarine men would have died, had they not been 
rescued" depends for its truth on the existent world 
but it does not express a fact simply exemplified in 
the existent world. 	Different kinds of propositions 
may depend for their truth on the real in different 
ways, and this may constitute a ground for arguing that 
they are true only in different senses of the term "true". 
It might be possible to distinguish a general meaning of 
the word "truth" and a set of more special meanings 
which could all be regarded as applications of the 
general. 	Parallel to this we could posit a general 
meaning of 'good' and a set of special meanings. 
trA is good" generally then means "A is such that 
it ought to be the object of a pro-attitude." 
Of course involved in this 'general' definition 
are subsets of meaning. 
"Being kind to people" is good in the sense that 
I ought to have a pro-attitude toward it. 
"Bating fillet steak" for me at any rate is good 
and I have a pro-attitude to eating steak. 
But while I "admire" the first kind of action I do 
not "admire" the second. The pro-attitude is of a 
different kind. 
This kind of distinction enables me to say that 
moral judgements can be true and yet be true-in-a-
different-sense to that in which factual propositions 
are true. 
Five points might be made in support of the view 
that ethical judgements (though autonomous) can be true 
or false. In this paper they can be indicated rather 
than argued at length. 
1. There is the irresistible tendency shown in language 
to treat ethical judgements as indicative statements. 
It is clear that our language usage comes about from 
periods and through periods when ethical statements 
were treated as a kind of metaphysical statement or 
as a kind of empirical statement. 	But attempts 
to 'isolate' ethics as a separate discipline did not , 
have and have not had a tendency to remove the 
indicative. While the current usage does not prove 
anything it cannot be ignored. 
2. When I am trying to decide what to do, I am conscious 
of trying to find out something and not merely of 
trying to decide one way or the other in order to 
escape the discomfort of indecision. 	/ feel I am 
trying to find out the truth about what I ought to do. 
3. Ethical judgenents agree with ordinary judgements in 
depending for their validity on their relation to 
the factual nature of the real. 
The proposition "You are hurting me" depends for its 
truth on a network (possibly quite complex) of facts. 
The judgement "You ought not to kill Tom merely 
because you don't fancy the tie he is wearing" also 
depends for its truth on a network of facts. 
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4. Pictures of "commanding" or "decid ing" will not 
fit past actions, the more so if we wish to change 
a moral judgement about a past action. In addition 
to this difficulty there is the further complication 
that in making a "moral judgement" there seems to be 
always more than a prescriptive element (and prior 
to it). Before I say "Do not kill Tom" something 
has gone on very like a mental process of assessment 
or evaluation. 
5. Lastly and arising from the fourth point, ethical 
judgements differ from commands, exhortations or 
practical decisions in that they do not only urge 
actions on oneself or others, they claim that there 
is good reason for urging them (without of course 
specifying the reason). 
"Stop kicking that dog" is an imperative that 
invites the question "why?" which itself often 
means "why should I?". Answers like: "Because I 
say so", "Because, he is bleeding", "Because he 
cannot kick back", are unsatisfactory unless they 
carry some moral implication e.g. "You are hurting 
him, and it's wrong to inflict pain needlessly", or 
"You are a man, and a decent man does not behave 
like that." 
Having suggested that "moral judgements" can of 
themselves be true or false, / must face the question 
of criteria. How is the truth of judgements to be 
established when there is conflict? 
For the religious man criteria may be found in 
the tenets of his religion. 	For some these criteria 
will be sufficient. For others they will do until they 
can find out more about the reasons for deeming an 
action or a class of actions to be right or wrong, just 
as there is wisdom in a child obeying the decrees of a 
trusted parent until the child can fathom the reasons 
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behind a parent's judgements. 	It seems to me 
arbitrary to say that we can never know the criteria 
by which moral judgements are to be recognised as true 
or false. 
As Arnaud Reid points out in his review(' the 
student preparing to be a teacher needs to become aware 
of his own aims and values and to be critical of them, 
and with this in mind to formulate,a working educational 
faith by which he nay live and act, modifying his views 
in the light of his continuing experience. 	He needs 
to have his attention drawn to the most fundamental 
issues and to learn a technique of clarifying the concepts 
with which he will think and rethink the questions he 
considers important. Professor O'Connor puts before 
the student the usefulness of philosophical analysis 
and explains some of its procedures, but he is restrictive 
and intolerant and perhaps on the matters of religion 
and morality misleading. . 
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=Imps 
To educate a man we must have some notion of 
what it is we are to educate. The present general 
climate of opinion rejects a "soul component". Indeed 
we are being shown the possibility of a value-free 
concept of man1 1 	In any event it is not respectable 
to consider the "spiritual" development of a man in the 
way that many of our forefathers would have done. (vide 
-Godliness and Good Learning- David Newsome. John 
Murray, 1961). 
Professor Partridge In the 1966 Buntine Oration 
quoted Jacques Barrun "What are the broad divisions of 
thought and action in the world? There are three and 
only three: we live in a world saturated in science, 
in a world beset by political and economic problems, 
and in a world that mirrors its life in literature, 
philosophy, religion, and the fine arts." 2 	It is 
significant that he chose to speak on the second of 
these divisions as the area which needed attention in 
schools. 
Many people would agree that world problems can 
be solved by the application of a developed social 
science, the continued use of technology, and improved 
"communication". 	A survey of articles in the 
Australian Journal of Education would confirm that this 
is a common view. Brian Mill in a recent article 3 is 
critical of the pragmatist approach that is so prevalent. 
Such an approach is evident in an earlier article by . 3.P. Powell4  xn which he distinguishes Hardie, O'Connor, 
and Scheffler from the "nonsense which usually passes 
for the philosophy of education." 	J.C. Walker, 
reviewing the educational philosophy of Professor M.V.C. 
Jeffreys, writes: 
68. 
"This irrationalist bent appears to be the result 
of considerable existentialist influence on Jeffreys. 
His discussion of knowledge and truth centres almost 
entirely on the individual. It is a frequent 
characteristic of existentialists that they appeal to 
a kind of intuitive knowledge to substantiate their 
epistemological positions, and this is in most cases 
self knowledge rather than the fruit of empirical 
enquiry." 5 
To be metaphysical is to be suspect; to be 
theological is to be condemned as an educational 
philosopher. 	And yet Paul Hurst can ask, Where are 
values to be found?6 , Peters can speak of a "passion 
for truth", Kneller does allow a role for Metaphysics, 8 
as does Maurice Halson. 
"It is this miter's belief that no satisfactory 
answers can be found to any, practical questions concerning 
teaching methods, curricula, or aims of education until 
due regard has first been given to the question of the 
nature of reality." 
The big questions are not being tackled on the 
ground that they do not fit into a framework of 
empiricist, positivist, and materialist thought. But 
the questions remain - unanswered, and in the present 
climate of thought unanswerable. As a result there is 
in education a "lack of perception of range and profundity" 10 . 
We effectively banish from our Universities and Sthools 
"ideas about the conduct of life". 11 
"One has to admit that today it is scientific 
knowledge that is uppermost in the minds of the people - 
knowledge WhiCh'islactual, deriVed by public investigation, 
certified by statistics, and with no mystical overtones. 
With this type of knoml.ndge discovery of certain aspects 
of the external world and disclosure of certain 
69. 
'natural' processes have been facilitated. This 
suggests that man is increasingly in a position where 
he can manipulate and, hopefully, control his destiny.... 
But this type of knowledge does not in itself say how 
one ought to decide or what decisions one ought to 
make." 12  
It has long been said within the Churches that 
academic leadership was antagonistic to religion. The 
reply was, yes, that is so, because your religion is 
irrational and does not meet the standards laid down 
simply by A.J. Ayer. 	The word "irrational" of course 
was a lboo'_word, serving the purpose at hand better 
than "extra-rational" which might have been fairer. 
Young men and women have therefore concluded that it is 
unintellectual to be religious. Assuredly, religion 
was irrelevant to educational philosophy. 
But the times are changing, and straws in the 
wind suggest that theology will become intellectually 
respectable again within the field of education. 
Anna Hogg's lecture to the /.V.}. in Perth in 1961 was 
entitled "The Relevance of a Christian Philosophy of 
Education", and the whole lecture is germane to the 
present argument, though space allows only a small 
extract. 
"To argue that the speculative function of 
Philosophy Must be ruled out because it does not meet 
the requirements of science (whatever the interpretation 
of those requiremente), is to prejudge the whole question 
and to be guilty of using the very procedure the argument 
is trying to eliminate," 13 
More recently she has said this: 14  
"The man in the street regards faith and invest-
igation as contradictory notions, for does not faith mean 
unquestioning acceptance and honest investigation the 
70. 
subordination of faith. 	In more sophisticated forma, 
perhaps, this view is widely held by academics. 
Basically the problem as they see it is that religion 
and research are by their very nature mutually 
exclusive and indeed incompatible." 	She goes on to 
explain that such a view is erroneous. 	To be an 
educationist and a philosopher and a Christian is 
possible despite many opinions to the contrary. 
Dr. Paul Tillich was even more outspoken. 
"Another unsolved problem of contemporary education 
must be brought out, namely its claim to be humanistic. 
Genuine humanism is a matter of absolute seriousness. 
It is religious in substance though cultural in form. 
It considers the hum= potentialities as expressions 
of man's being a mirror of the universe and its creative 
ground. 	When the religious substance of humanism 
disappeared, the more form was left, abundant but empty. 
And today the means of mass communication mediate these 
empty remnants of former cultural creations to everybody 
day and night. But we must ask, which of these 
cultural goods speaks to us as the German poet, Rilke, 
felt that the torso of a Greek Apollo spoke to him: 
'Change thy life! 	Cultural goods have become 
trimmings, means for having a good time, but nothing 
ultimately serious." 15 
So our young students can read "Jane Eyre", write 
critically about Charlotte Brant°, and yet fail utterly 
to understand the basis of Jane Byre's morality. 
The same young people would scoff at Hooker's 
aphorism in the beginning of Ecclesiastical Polity, 
Book V. 
"True Religion is the root of all true virtues and 
the stay of all well ordered commonwealths." 
71. 
It is not merely that churches are empty, Bibles 
unread, prayers at mother's knee unspoken. 	Our 
society has in general cut itself off from its roots. 
Education, in the English speaking world, like our 
civilization in general, is founded on the Christian 
faith; in a thousand ways that "faith" is built into 
our inheritance. Such is the burden of Spencer 
16 Leeson's 1944 Bampton Lectures. 	Not only have we 
repudiated that "faith"; we have proscribed "faith" as 
subordinate to "reason". 
In one of the famous sentences of English, 
Hilton wrote "I can therefore a complete and generous 
education that which fits a man to perform justly, 
skilfully and magnanimously all the offices both 
private and public of peace and war." 	The adverbs 
are worth noting for they call to mind a disposition 
eloquently described by the prophet Micah: "to do 
justly, to love mercy and to walk humbly." 	Such a 
disposition is not suddenly put on and it does not 
emerge as a recommendation from a conference of experts. 
It grows with a man as he grows and it comes from the . 
culture into which he is born and by education inducted, 
in an environment where men seek the whole truth through 
debate, without prejudice and without passion. 
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